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A Critical Appraisal 
of the Economie Rationale 
of Government-Subsidized 
Manpower Training 
Ozay MEHMET 
The author endeavors to présent a detailed analysis 
of the économie rationale of a manpower training poiicy, 
and provides useful insights on its limits through a sélective 
study of macro-, micro-, and welfare économie theory. 
Récent years hâve witnessed a rapid expansion of govemment-
subsidized manpower training schemes. This fact represents a new form 
of state intervention in the workings of the labour market. As a resuit, 
it gives rise to a number of fundamental questions such as : What is the 
rationale of a manpower training poiicy ? On what économie grounds 
can government subsidy for manpower training be justified ? What are 
the limits of manpower training poiicy ? Thèse sort of questions hâve 
received surprisingly little attention by economists who hâve shown no 
reluctance to undertake studies designed to evaluate the économie effect-
iveness of public expenditures on manpower training. While this one-
sided interest can be explained, in part, by the relative attractiveness of 
empirical as opposed to conceptual problems, the importance of the 
questions raised cannot be ignored, 
particularly in the contemporary 
world of rising taxes and govern-
ment costs. 
MEHMET, O., Ph.D., Assistant Pro-
fessor, Department of Economies, 
University of Windsor. 
* The author would like to thank his colleagues, Prof essors D. P. Ross, and 
B. Green (University of Windsor) for their helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. 
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Accordingly, this article endeavours to présent a detailed analysis 
of the economic rationale of a manpower training policy with an attempt 
to infer guidelines from economic theory for determining its ïimits. This 
will be done by examining three major topics in économies that shed 
considérable light on the rationale of a govemment-subsidized training 
scheme. Thèse topics, drawn respectively from macro-, micro-, and 
welfare-economics, are : the Structural Unemployment Hypothesis, the 
Structured Labour Market Hypothesis, and the Externality Argument. 
It should be stated at the outset that it is not the aim of this 
article to survey the extensive literature dealing with thèse topics, nor 
is it to give an exhaustive account of thèse topics ; rather, the purpose 
is to examine, fairly selectively, those aspects of each topic that provide 
useful insights for a clear account of the economic rationale of a man-
power training policy. 
The Structural Unemployment Hypothesis 
The structuralist debate* has played an important rôle in the 
émergence of manpower training as a spécifie tool of labour market 
policy2. It is therefore worthwhile to examine the arguments advanced 
by the structuralists in favour of goverciment-sponsored training schemes. 
At the root of the structural unemployment hypothesis is the 
assumption that the market-price mechanism, particularly the employment 
market, has become less efficient as an allocator of manpower resources 
among occupations, industries and régions. This assumption rests, 
basically, on two arguments. First, shifts in the composition of final 
demand and technology bring about a ' twist ' in the mix of labour 
demand by reducing the demand of untrained workers while increasing 
the demand for trained workers 3. Second, the market mechanism cannot 
bring about a smooth and speedy readjustment of the labour force to 
1
 For a comprehensive survey of the structuralist debate, see John W. L. 
WINDER, « Structural Unemployment » in The Canadian Labour Market : Readings 
in Manpower Economies, Arthur Kruger and Noah M. Meltz, editors, Centre for 
Industrial Relations, University of Toronto, 1968, pp. 135-220. 
2
 In point of fact, it may be stated that structural unemployment and fears 
about automation were the immédiate causes leading to the enactment of législation 
providing for federally-supported training programmes in Canada and the United 
States in the early sixties. 
3
 Charles KILLINGSWORTH, « Automation, Jobs and Manpower » in Labor and 
the National Economy, William G. Bowen, editor, New York, W.W. Norton & Co. 
Inc., 1965, p. 127. 
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' twists ' in the composition of final demand or technology partly because 
of limited mobility of existing supply of labour between différent occup-
ations, industries or régions, and partly because the development of 
trained manpower requires a certain period of time. As a resuit, there 
may be a mismatching of supply and demand in the labour market with 
unplaced job-seekers co-existing with unfilled vacancies, which may persist 
for as long as the skills and qualifications of unplaced job-seekers do not 
match the requirements of employers. In the long-run, of course, the 
price-market mechanism may bring about an equilibrium in the employ-
ment market. But, partly because this long-run equilibrium may be 
attained after a significant time-lag, and partly because in the short-run 
it may necessitate either a politically unacceptable level of unemployment 
or a rapid rise in priées, reliance on the traditional tools or stabilization, 
which operate via the price mechanism, cannot afford a sufficient pres-
cription for eliminating persistent unemployment. The remedy must, 
therefore, be sought in labour market policies such as manpower training 
and mobility programmes designed to bring about a more adaptable and 
mobile supply of manpower resources, and thereby a speedier equilibrating 
process in the labour market and an improved reconciliation between 
price stability and unemployment4. 
THE TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
The manner in which this resuit can be achieved has been consider-
ably clarified in theory with the important development of the Phillips-
Lipsey Trade-Off Curve5. 
Figure I illustrâtes the type of contribution that a manpower training 
policy can make to the achievement of * better ' trade-off options yielding 
high employment with price stability. The RR curve called the trade-off 
curve, shows the combinations of unemployment and percentage change 
of priées which can be attained by varying the level of aggregate demand 
by means of fiscal and monetary policies. The slope and position of 
4
 While assigning first priority on labour market policies, structuralists reco-
gnize the importance of fiscal and monetary measures. Thus, Killingsworth em-
phasized the need for « a whole arsenal of weapons » consisting of a mix of tra-
ditional stabilisation policies and increased manpower training and mobility pro-
grams. Op. cit., p. 135. 
5
 A. W. PHILLIPS, «The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of 
Change in Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957 » in Economica, 
November, 1958, pp. 283-299; R. G. LIPSEY, «Structural and Deficient-Demand 
Unemployment Reconsidered » in Employment Policy and the Labor Market, Ar-
thur M. Ross, editor, University of California Press, 1965, pp. 210-255. 
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FIGURE I 
Phillips-Lipsey Trade-Off Curve 
P 2 
§ Px 
6 Level 
N^ of Unemploymeni 
R 
the RR curve at any given period is determined by the structure of the 
labour force, volume of labour mobility, availability and utilization of 
labour market information and, generally, structural relationships in the 
economy. While différent combinations of unemployment and inflation 
could be achieved by movements along the RR curve through appropriate 
fiscal and monetary measures, the impact of manpower training would be 
to shift the RR curve leftwards to, say, R' R \ 6 If the politically 
6 There are other factors beside manpower training that can shift the RR 
curve leftwards. Thèse include increased rate of productivity gains, décline in 
union power in collective bargaining, increased competitiveness in product markets, 
and incomes policy. 
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acceptable price inflation were fixed at Px the effect of manpower training 
would be to eut the level of unemployment that would be consistent with 
this rate of inflation from V1 to U2. Alternatively, if the level of accept-
able unemployment is fixed at U2, then the rate of inflation would be 
reduced from P2 to P l t 
In summary, therefore, the structuralist case for a government-
subsidized manpower training programme rests on the premise that it can 
improve the reconciliation of price stability and high employment level. 
Thus, a neat theoretical justification for such a training programme can 
be inferred from the trade-off analysis. 
OPTIMAL VOLUME OF TRAINING 
A goverament-subsidized training scheme will, no doubt, hâve a 
cost representing opportunity foregone elsewhere by using public ressources 
for such a scheme. Matched against this cost is the expected benefit of 
additional real output, i.e. less unemployment or inflation. A leftward 
shift in the trade-off curve due to manpower training reflects the assump-
tion that the benefits of training (measured in terms of the présent value 
of additional real output) exceed the costs of providing it. Assuming 
that ail government-subsidized training yielding a net return on the; basis 
of benefit-cost analysis shift the trade-off curve leftwards, it does not 
follow that the scale of such training should be extended up to the point 
where the average benefit-cost ratio falls to unity : the optimum scale of 
training is determined not by average but by marginal benefit-cost ratio. 
The latter is the point where the benefits added by the last incrément 
of training, (e.g. the last trained person) hâve fallen to the level where 
they just return the cost of providing this incrémental amount of training. 
Normally, the average benefit-cost ratio would continue being greater than 
unity for a significant volume of training beyond the point where the 
marginal benefit-cost ratio falls to unity. However, it would be inefficient 
to push the scale of training any further than that which is indicated 
by the marginal criterion. Viewing costs and benefits from the stand-
point of community as a whole, violation of the marginal criterion would 
imply that the social sacrifice incurred elsewhere in the economy in order 
to support the incrémental scale of training is greater than the contri-
bution of this incrémental scale to social real income. In that situation 
it would be to society's advantage to reduce the amount of government-
subsidized manpower training until equality between social costs and 
benefits is attained. 
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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE STRUCTURALIST CASE 
While theoretically attractive, the structuralist argument for govern-
ment-subsidized training has serious practical limitations. In the first 
place, no empirical évidence has been furnished by its proponents showing 
that training schemes can effectively shift the trade-off curve leftwards 
as assumed in theory despite the fact that several empirical studies suggest 
that such schemes generate significant net returns on the basis of benefît-
cost studies. 7 Since there are other factors capable of shifting the trade-
off curve besides manpower training, the task is complicated by identifi-
cation and measurement problems surrounding the relative contribution 
of the latter to an improvement in the trade-off options. In practice, 
a trained worker can be placed in a job only if there are more jobs and 
more jobs will be available only if and when aggregate demand is 
expanding. So long as the supply of training cannot of itself create demand 
for trained workers, training can play only a limited rôle as a complément 
of demand — stimulating policies. As a gênerai rule, manpower training 
policy can make a greater contribution in periods of rising aggregate 
demand and tight labour market-conditions than in recessionary periods. 
Another major difficulty with the structuralist case for government-
subsidized training programmes concerns the practical détermination of 
the optimal amount of such training. Although the marginal criterion 
discussed above provides an attractive theoretical yardstick, the mea-
surement of marginal costs and benefits, particularly from the social 
viewpoint, is a hazardous and elusive task. To date no satisfactory methods 
for this purpose hâve been devised. Virtually ail empirical benefit-cost 
studies hâve been conducted in terms of average rather than marginal be-
nefits and costs 8. Yet, it has been shown above that the average criterion 
has a tendency to resuit in a inefficiently large scale of training. Conse-
quently, the case for government-subsidized manpower training, if and 
7 Récent studies of American manpower training schemes, subsidized by the 
fédéral and state governments, indicate as high as 109% rate of return for maie 
trainees. See : G. O. CAIN and E. W. STROMSDORFER, « Retraining in West Vir-
ginia : An Economic Evaluation », in Retraining the Unemployed, G. G. Somers, 
editor, the University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1968, p. 323. Other benefit-
cost studies show similarly favourable results for public expenditure on training. 
See : M. E. BORUS, « A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Effectiveness of Retraining 
the Unemployment », Y aie Economic Essays volume 4, Fall, 1964, pp. 371-430; 
D. A. PAGE, « Retraining Under the Manpower Act : A Benefit-Cost Analysis » 
Public Policy, Volume 13, 1964, pp. 257-267. 
8 For a typical example see the article by D. A. PAGE referred to in the pre-
ceeding footnote. 
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when supported by empirical findings based on the average criterion, is 
likely to involve a certain élément of overselling. 
There is one spécial case of structural unemployment which, at 
first sight, appears to lend convincing support for a government-subsidized 
training scheme : Manpower redundancy resulting from the introduction 
of labour-saving production techniques or from industrial décline in a 
spécifie locality. A closer examination of the situation, however, may 
lead to a différent conclusion. For example, if manpower redundancy 
occurs in a labour-surplus area, a training or retraining scheme, by itself, 
is more likely to stimulate out-migration than re-employment locally. In 
view of this prospect, it is necessary to study the feasibility of promoting 
capital inflow into the area as an alternative to encouraging outward 
mobility of labour through training. In the former approach, a training 
scheme may well play an important rôle as a complément to, say, fiscal 
incentives designed to attract new industry into the région. Such a rôle, 
however, will be more limited than what might hâve appeared at first. 
The Structurée! Labour Market Hypothesis 
The structuralists evaluate the allocative efficiency of the labour 
market in macro-economic terms ; their justification for government-
subsidized training rests on macro criteria. But, economists hâve tradi-
tionally analysed the workings of the labour market using the tools of 
micro-economics, such as the principle of marginal productivity of labour 
and the assumptions of partial equilibrium analysis. 
The traditional (marginalist) analysis of the labour market has, 
in the last quarter century, been challenged by the institutional labour 
economists who hâve generally taken the viewpoint that the imperfections 
and rigidities of the market are more important and persistent than the 
classical and neo-classical theorists, with the notable exception of Cairnes, 
assumed. 9 The empiricists formulated an original picture of the modem 
labour market that focused attention on the supply side of the market 
in contrast to the marginal productivity principle of the traditional wage 
theory which emphasized the demand side. The modem theory, generally 
9 For an early statement of the marginal analysis controversy, see L. R. A. 
LESTER, « Shortcomings of the Marginal Analysis for Wage Employment Pro-
blems » American Economie Review, March 1946, pp. 63-82 ; and F. MACHLUP, 
« Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research », American Economie Review, Sep-
tember 1946, pp. 519-554. 
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labelled as the « structured » market,10 is significant specifically because 
it focused attention on market imperfections, the rôle of trade unions, 
impediments to labour mobility and institutional factors lessenkig or 
even preventing the opération of the compétitive forces of the market 
mechanism. 
Essentially, the structured market hypothesis is based on the insula-
tion of certain segments of the work-force from the compétitive forces 
of the market. It has two main restrictive effects : On the one hand, 
it limits the range of occupational choice open to job-seekers by 
creating institutional barriers in the hiring and recruitment practices of 
firms. On the other hand, workers already employed, become locked-in n , 
or committed to, particular firms thereby acquiring spécifie or untrans-
ferable skills. The resuit is that labour mobility tends to be minimized 
and job-seekers are prevented from moving to jobs offering the most 
favourable employment ternis. 
The controversy between the marginalists and the institutionalists 
now appears to hâve reached a form of réconciliation. Thus, it is 
generally accepted that institutional obstacles to labour mobility tend 
to slow down the compétitive forces in the labour market so that a 
market disequilibrium, in the form of a shortage or excess of supply, is 
more a less a usual state of affairs at any point in time. On the other hand, 
the long-run tendency towards equilibrium as predicated by the marginalist 
wage theory seems to command gênerai acceptance. Thus, « the usual 
approach to wage theory today involves analyses of the demand for 
labour in accordance with the marginal productivity principle and of the 
supply of labour in accordance with the structured market ».12 
THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION : 
Récognition that manpower shortages or surpluses are fairly usual 
conditions in the labour market at any point in time has lead writers to 
10 L. FISHER, « The Harvest Labor Market » in Labor Problems : Cases and 
Readings, G. P. Schultz and J. R. Coleman, editors, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 
2nd édition, 1959: C. KERR, « Balkanization of Labor Markets » in E. W. 
BAKKE et al : Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity, New York, John Wiley, 
1954. 
il See L. G. REYNOLDS, The Structure of Labor Markets, New York, Harper and 
Brothers, 1951, pp. 79-83 ; R. A. LESTER, Hiring Practicies and Labor Compé-
tition, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1954, Chapter 5. 
12 E. J. BURTT, JR., Labor Markets, Unions and Government Policies, New 
York, St. Martin's Press, 1963, p. 300. 
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press for a « positive or active manpower policy » 13 aimed at strengthen-
ing the effectiveness of the allocative mechanism of the market. The 
mix of action programmes recommended include the collection and dissé-
mination of labour market information especially concerning job vacancies 
and job-seekers ; job counselling and career guidance services ; man-
power-forecasting to dérive future requirements by occupations, industries 
and régions ; and provision of mobility, training and retraining programmes. 
In the context of an active manpower policy, government-subsidized 
training programmes can be said to serve three principal objectives : 
( 1 ) to remove observed manpower shortages by increasing supply ; 
(2) to raise the employability of job-seekers who otherwise would 
remain unemployed or under-employed ; and (3) to enhance the trans-
ferability of workers, who for some reason, may wish to move from one 
firm or région to another. 
The argument that government-subsidized training is required to 
remove manpower shortages présumes that the private sector supplies 
only an insufficient volume of training as, for example, shown by the 
relatively small number of skilled craftsmen provided by apprenticeship 
schemes. Similarly, the argument for increased employability through 
training is supported with référence to the existence of disadvantaged 
groups and institutional barriers to hiring in certain firms. On the other 
hand, the promotion of transferability of labour by training and retrain-
ing schemes is justâfied as a means of offsetting narrow or excessive 
specialization which tends to tie workers to their existing jobs or 
localities. 
In summary, it is agreed that government-subsidized training schemes 
can contribute in several ways to the development of a more adaptable 
and flexible labour force and a more efficient utilisation of its manpower 
resources. 
A CRITIQUE OF THE INSTITUTIONALIST CASE : 
Admittedly, thèse arguments provide a powerful rationale for a 
government-subsidized training. However, as this rationale is derived 
from a presumed failure of the private sector to undertake what is 
considered to be an adéquate volume of training, it can only be used to 
justify a residual amount of government-subsidized training, i.e. over 
13
 E. W. BAKKE, A Positive Labor Market Policy, Charles E. Merrill Books 
Inc., Colombus, Ohio, 1963 ; R. A. LESTER, Manpower Planning in a Free Society, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966 ; Organization for Economie Coopér-
ation and Development, Active Manpower Policy, Final Report, Paris 1965. 
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and above what the private firms and workers would be willing and able 
to supply. In practice, it would be virtually impossible to identify and 
quantify ail the various types of training undertaken in the private 
sector 14. It would be even harder to détermine which type of training 
should be subsidized and in which industries and occupations 15. Under 
the circumstances, government is likely to subsidize certain training 
activities that would be carrier out in the private sector anyway. Thus, 
the argument that the private sector provides insufficient volume of 
training may tend to overstate the case for government subsidized training. 
This possibility is further enhanced by the difficulty of translating 
theoretical criteria regarding, for instance, the sélection of trainees, into 
practical, operational terms. Thus, although it may be inferred from 
efficiency criteria that no person should be admitted into a training 
scheme unless the value of his pre-training marginal product is less 
than the going wage-rate in the occupation for which he is most suited, 
and similarly that no trainee should complète a training course until 
the value of his marginal product is raised effectively up to the level 
of the going wage-rate in the occupation for which he is being trained, 
in practice it would be virtually impossible to administer a training 
programme on such criteria. Thus, typically admission into government-
subsidized training programmes is likely to be considerably less rigorous 
than what the efficiency criteria would imply. 
The objective of promoting labour transferability through training, 
too, is likely to overstate the case for a government-subsidized training 
scheme since it implies that greater labour mobility is necessarily béné-
ficiai. In fact, mobility of labour usually générâtes significant private 
and social costs such as the recruitment costs incurred by hiring firms 
and the opportunity cost of time spent in changing employers or localities. 
Therefore, the objective of promoting labour transferability through 
14
 The wide range of training activities provided by private firms include 
induction or familiarisation courses on-the-job or in spécial work-shops or class-
rooms (usually following hiring), informai instruction given by foremen or 
supervisors on-the-job, safety and first-aid classes, démonstrations (when new 
equipment is introduced), and various types of executive and management training 
schemes. Often training activities may last a few days or hours. 
15
 G. BECKER'S well-known distinction between spécifie and gênerai training 
may appear to résolve the issue. His arguments imply that government should 
subsidize only gênerai training since this is the type that is likely to enhance the 
mobility and employability of the trainee. However, in practice it is very difficult 
to distinguish between spécifie and gênerai types of training. On this problem, see 
G. S. BECKER : Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, New York, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964, pp. 11-29. 
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training should be pursued only if and when the associated benefits are 
greater than the associated costs. This criterion will inevitably lead to 
a more restricted pursuit of the objective of promoting labour transfer-
ability through training than otherwise. 
The Externality Argument 
The externality argument16 is a theoretical attempt to demonstrate 
the practical unattainability of the formai conditions of gênerai equilibrium 
theory owing to the génération of external économies or diseconomies 
from incidental market inter-dependence between individuals. The; géné-
ration of thèse externalities is offered as a proof of a fondamental diver-
gence between social and private net products that cause the compétitive 
market, otherwise guided by Adam Smith's « invisible hand » principle, 
to fail to achieve « Idéal output ». The argument is then given as a 
justification for government intervention in the workings of the price 
mechanism with appropriate taxes and subsidies to offset thèse extern-
alities and move the economy nearer towards «idéal output». 
THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIES OF MANPOWER TRAINING 
One spécifie source of external économies, long recognized by 
economists, is mampower training. Marshall was the first economist who 
referred to the external économies of training to explain the reluctance 
of private employers to invest in a training programme. He stated. « that 
whoever may incur the expense of investing capital in developing the 
abilities of the workman, thèse abilities will be the property of the 
workman himself ».17 MarshalPs implication is that, since trained man-
power can be utiMsed by many firms, the possibility of pirating by 
competitors acts as a disincentive for a profit-maximizing firm to invest 
in a skill development programme. Whenever external économies of 
training are generated, the firm which invests in training will receive 
less than the total return on its investment because some other firms 
will reap benefits at the expense of the investor. Consequently, when 
the private marginal net return on investment in training falls to zéro, 
the social marginal net return will still be positive. Therefore, from the 
standpoint of society as a whole, an increase in the scale of manpower 
training will be called for in spite of the fact that private firms will not 
be prepared to undertake the additional training. 
16
 W. J. BAUMOL, Welfare Economies and the Theory of the State, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 2nd édition, 1965. 
17
 A. MARSHALL, Principles of Economies, Macmillan & Co. Ltd„, 1962, 
8th édition, p. 237. 
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On the other hand, even if it were assumed that the workers were 
rational utility maximizers, it is virtually certain that there will still be 
an underinvestment in training by workers themselves since the private 
rate of time préférence will be in excess of the social rate in order to 
make up for the considérable uncertainty of pay-off. In addition, since 
human capital is a highly illiquid asset and cannot be sold, it would 
ordinarily make a poor collatéral for bank loans to finance a private 
training course. Furthermore, those most urgently requiring training 
in order to stay or become employed, such as the ' disadvantaged ' and 
the unskilled persons, are typically the least likely to hâve means to 
purchase training. This may be true even though the implicit rate of 
return, both in private and social terms, may be extremely attractive. 
Since the scale of manpower training undertaken in the private 
sector is likely to be below the social scale as indicated by the social rate 
of time préférence, it follows that net social benefits will be generated 
by a govemment-subsidized manpower training programme. Or, as one 
economist put it, « there is scope for a gain in efficiency through pro-
grammes for re-training and re-location of labour, programmes that would 
be socially profitable (viewed as an kivestment in increasing productive 
capacity) but are not undertaken privately largely owing to the institu-
tional difficulties of borrowing and lending on the security of human 
capital ».18 
A CRITIQUE OF THE EXTERNALITY CASE 
It has been argued 19 that the case for government intervention in 
economic organization, based on the externality argument, has tradition-
ally been exaggerated by economists because the traditional approach has 
called for restraining harmful external effects without considering the 
spill-over effects stemming from the proposed government measures them-
selves. According to this argument the problem raised by externalities is 
not simply one of restraining those responsible for harmful effects, but 
rather one of weighing whether the « gain from preventing the harm is 
greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a resuit of 
stopping the action which produces the harm ».20 To the extent that such 
a comparison is not undertaken, it is conceivable that some recommend-
18 H. G. JOHNSON, The Canadian Quandry, Economic Problems and Policies, 
Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1963, p. 62. 
19 R .H. COASE, «The Problem of Social Cost», The Journal of Law and 
Economies, Volume III, October, 1960, pp. 1-44. 
20 ibid., p. 27. 
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ations calling for state intervention in économie organization, based on 
the externality argument, may, in fact worsen rather than improve 
resource allocation. In terms of a government-subsidized training pro-
gramme, such a resuit would occur when an incrément of subsidized 
training displaces an incrément of private training at net social cost. 
For example, a government training agency may undertake to supply 
training when a private firm would hâve undertaken it anyway. Assuming 
that cost per unit of output in that firm is increased somewhat because, 
say, of fréquent control and inspection by government officals, net 
external diseconomies of training would be gênerated. 
A central difficulty with the externality argument is that estern-
alities, particularly in social terms, hâve never been satisfactorily measured 
by the measuring rod of money due to their elusive character. Of course 
measureability is not a pre-requisite for accepting the existence or 
génération of external benefits of a training scheme financed by public 
funds. It is, however, necessary for determining the optimal volume or 
the relative profitability of such a scheme. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed three topics in économies that shed light 
on the theoretical basis and scope of government intervention in the 
workings of the employment market with manpower training schemes. 
The three topics were the structural unemployment hypothesis, the struc-
tured market controversy and the externality arguments. 
It has been shown how a rationale for a government-subsidized 
training scheme can be derived from each of thèse topics. In summary, 
it was seen that the structuralist case rests on the assumption that such 
a scheme can improve the trade-off options for achieving consistently 
and simultaneously, the twin objectives of price stability and high level 
of employment ; that the structured market approach yields a rationale 
centering on the premise that the private sector is unwilling or unable 
to undertake an adéquate volume of training consistent with a described 
rate of économie growth : and that the externality argument présents a 
case on the ground that a government-subsidized training programme 
would generate net social external économies. 
It has been shown however, that ail three topics are subject to 
strong counter-arguments which suggest that, for theoretical and oper-
ational reasons, the actual scale of government-subsidized training can 
well be pushed beyond the optimal point. 
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LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE À LA BASE DES 
PROGRAMMES DE FORMATION DE LA 
MAIN-D'OEUVRE 
Les programmes gouvernementaux de formation de la main-d'oeuvre ont connu 
depuis quelques années une expansion rapide. Les économistes entreprennent sans 
hésiter des recherches empiriques visant à évaluer le rendement des fonds publics 
utilisés à cette fin, sans s'attacher outre mesure, cependant, aux théories de base 
qui motivent une politique de formation de la main-d'oeuvre. 
Comment expliquer la politique de formation de la main-d'oeuvre ? 
Est-il justifiable de financer les programmes de formation de la main-d'oeuvre 
au moyen de fonds publics ? Quelles sont les limites d'une politique de formation 
de la main-d'oeuvre ? 
Nous analysons ces questions à la lumière de trois aspects économiques im-
portants, issus respectivement de la macro- et de la micro-économique, et de 
l'économique du bien-être. 
Premièrement, l'hypothèse du chômage structurel justifie théoriquement ces 
programmes de formation en supposant qu'elles rendront plus faciles les échanges 
nécessaires pour obtenir à la fois une stabilité des prix et un niveau élevé d'emploi ; 
deuxièmement, l'hypothèse d'un marché du travail structuré en confirme le bien-
fondé en affirmant que le secteur privé ne veut pas ou ne peut pas satisfaire à la 
demande de formation de la main-d'oeuvre requise par le taux de croissance 
économique. 
Troisièmement, l'hypothèse des bénéfices sociaux justifie ces programmes par 
le fait qu'une telle politique gouvernementale produit, au niveau social, des écono-
mies nettement supérieures aux coûts impliqués. 
Une évaluation de ces trois approches permet d'y voir d'importantes limites. 
Pour ce qui est de l'argument au niveau structurel, il est prouvé que la formation 
de la main-d'œuvre ne joue qu'un rôle restreint dans la stimulation de la demande, 
puisque l'offre de travailleurs plus qualifiés ne peut pas d'elle-même créer une 
demande pour ces travailleurs qualifiés. L'argument structuraliste ne tient pas 
compte des difficultés qui existent à évaluer l'ampleur et le type de la formation 
déjà fournie par l'entreprise privée et par les travailleurs eux-mêmes, ainsi que la 
quantité résiduelle de formation que le gouvernement devra fournir pour combler 
le déficit. Pour ce qui est des bénéfices sociaux de ces programmes, il est tout 
indiqué d'affirmer qu'ils échappent à toute mesure monétaire, de sorte qu'il de-
meure impossible d'évaluer financièrement l'avantage social de ces programmes, 
ainsi que le coût qu'ils impliquent. 
On peut donc justifier la politique gouvernementale de financement des pro-
grammes de formation de la main-d'oeuvre, en s'appuyant sur la théorie économi-
que, sans pouvoir toutefois fixer le point d'ampleur que doit prendre ces program-
mes. Les problèmes théoriques et pratiques qui l'empêchent font voir aussi le danger 
qui existe de dépasser ce point maximal et de dépenser inutilement les fonds pu-
blics, sous prétexte qu'il est motivé par un raisonnement logique. 
Il est facile de pousser très loin un tel raisonnement et d'en exagérer l'im-
portance. 
